One Language, One World: The Common Measure of Education by Paul Standish
Title One Language, One World: The Common Measure ofEducation
Author(s)Paul Standish
CitationFinding Meaning, Cultures Across Borders: InternationalDialogue between Philosophy and Psychology (2011): 17-25
Issue Date2011-03-31
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2433/143043





One Language, One World: 
The Common Measure of Education 
PAUL STANDISH 
Institute of Education, University of London 
The central concern of this paper is with the possibility and the problems of there 
being a common world language, and with the relation of this question to culture 
and education. The paper begins with a question posed by Hilary Putnam relating 
to the credibility of Enlightenment values after the Holocaust, but it takes up a 
seemingly minor aspect of his discussion in order to enter into an extended 
exploration of questions of language and meaning. This is achieved via a 
discussion, in the light of a paper by Jacques Derrida, of a letter on the subject of 
language sent by Gershom Scholem to Franz Rosenzweig. The deconstruction 
that Derrida's reading achieves is considered as potentially offering a retrieval of 
the Enlightenment values that Putnam seeks. The particular status of English as a 
world language is considered in relation to the idea of one language, one world, 
while some ramifications of such homogenization are briefly explored. 
[E]ven posing the issue of cultural diversity, and of the sense that cultural 
diversity is in tension with the Enlightenment, in terms of "religions" (perhaps the 
concept of "religions" is itself a uniquely Western concept) and "history" (a 
notion that has come to have a special sense in the West in the last two or three 
centuries) is itself unduly parochial. Perhaps we in the West have far too narrow a 
sense of the wealth of human cultural· diversity, and perhaps this makes it easier 
for some of us to contemplate the idea of a world with one language, one 
literature, one music, one art, one politics-in a word, one culture (Putnam, 1994, 
p. 185). 
In the essay from which the above words are drawn, Hilary Putnam addresses the 
question 'whether ethics should be universalistic or should rather be rooted in the 
forms of life of particular traditions and cultures' (p. 182) in the light of two 
influential streams of thought. On the one hand, he turns to the political philosophy of 
John Rawls, recognizing him as, at the time, the greatest living social ethicist. How 
far that philosophy is properly described as universalistic is clarified through 
acknowledgement of Rawls' own claim that he was not discussing the 'foundations' 
of ethics but rather addressing the problem confronting Western bourgeois 
democracies since the French Revolution: the tension between equality and liberty. 
Putnam mentions Rawls' increasing pessimism about 'universalistic' ethical theory. 
On the other hand, he refers to George Steiner's suggestion that after the Holocaust! it 
may be impossible to believe that the values of the West have any vitality at all. 2 
Putting the thoughts of Rawls and Steiner together in this respect, Putnam finds 
himself in a 'bind': 
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If Rawls is right, ethical theory seems to require the framework of a tradition to 
give its questions substance, and to provide a shared framework of assumptions 
within which questions can be discussed. Yet the horrors to which the regnant 
Western tradition have led call into question, at least for some, the possibility of 
doing what Rawls suggests, that is, just assuming the basic values of the 
Enlightenment and calmly discussing how to adjudicate tensions between them 
(p. 183). . 
Putnam makes clear that he has no intention of abandoning such Enlightenment 
values as liberty, equality, and fraternity, but he is skeptical of the familiar response-
that it is not the values that are at fault but simply our compliance with them. The 
latter point is brought home in view of the lack of clarity about what these values 
amount to or how they are interpreted-as, for example, in the tensions between 
different notions of freedom and equality. Hence, the distinction between what our 
values are and our compliance with them is plainly too simple. But he emphasizes 
also that we should not tum our eyes away from the dissatisfaction with 
Enlightenment values felt by many people. He proceeds to weigh the purported tum in 
the work of Bernard Williams towards a 'relativity of distance' (pp. 191-192)3 against 
the moral possibilities and commitments of pragmatism, concluding by quoting 
William James: 'No one has insight into all the ideals. No one should presume to 
judge them off-hand. The pretension to dogmatize about them in each other is the root 
of most human injustices and cruelties, and the trait in human character most likely to 
make the angels weep' (James cited in Putnam, 1994, p. 196).4 
I do not purpose to address in the round the massive questions Putnam raises but 
rather to home in on one small aspect of the paper, upon which, I believe, so much 
else depends. The idea of one language, one culture, in the opening quotation leads 
Putnam to a recollection. While not wishing to say that most Enlightenment thinkers 
would endorse such an idea, he acknowledges that some have done. Rudoph Carnap, 
whose stature as a thinker and as a human being Putnam does not doubt, felt strongly 
that 'for all x, planned x is better than unplanned x': 
Thus the idea of a socialist world in which everyone spoke Esperanto (except 
scientists, who, for their technical work, would employ notations from symbolic 
logic) was one which would have delighted him. And I recently had a 
conversation with a student who remarked quite casually that it would not be a 
bad idea if there were only one language and one literature: "We would get used 
to it, and it might help to prevent war" (p. 185). 
I want to consider what, in the idea of one language, one culture, one education, might 
give the angels cause to weep. I shall do this by way of a historical, anecdotal 
digression, but I hope to show why this is warranted. The thought that there might be 
one language, whether an original language or one to come, leads into questions about 
the nature of meaning, in the light of which ideas of human being and, a fortiori, 
education cannot remain unaffected. 
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LANGUAGE AS VEHICLE, LANGUAGE AS NAME 
In 1926 Gershom Scholem wrote a letter to Franz Rosenzweig to mark the latter's 
fortieth birthday. Rosenzweig was by that time crippled with disease, and unable·· to 
speak. Scholem, deeply committed to the Zionism of the time, and to the revival of 
Hebrew as a living language that was part of that project, had left Berlin three years 
earlier in order to live in Palestine. But his letter, entitled 'Confession on the Subject 
of OUf Language' (Bekenntnis uber unsere Sprache), is a passionate lament, 
resounding with disillusionment, over the way that revival was being attempted, 
specifically over the ways that a sacred language was being reduced to a 'vehicular 
language', a language of communication, and thus becoming secular. It is the threat 
that this constituted that is the letter's burden. 
Two factors amplify the tensions surrounding the letter. In the first place, 
Rosenzweig regarded Zionism as itself a secularization of Messianism and hence as 
betrayal of the need to reform German Jewry from within. Scholem was more than 
aware of this view ~ for conflict over the issue had, in the years shortly before, been the 
cause of a complete break between the two men. In the second place, while Scholem 
believed that Rosenzweig was 'on the mend,' his condition was in fact degenerative 
and terminal. Scholem later remarked: 'I would never have broached this delicate 
topic, which stirred such emotions in us both, if I had known that Rosenzweig was 
then already in the first stages of his fatal disease, a lateral sclerosis' (Scho1em, 1980, 
p. 140). 
Scholem identifies himself and Rosenzweig as members of a generation of 
transition, and the responsibility to 'our children' resonates throughout the letter. In 
the Messianism of their mutual faith, this responsibility cannot be understood without 
reference to imperatives of transformation. The tone of the letter is prophetic, its 
eschatological force accentuated by the 'we.' To what exactly does it attest? 
Language has degenerated into a Volapuk, a supposedly all-purpose, maximally 
efficient means of communication, in which any significance of proper names is 
effaced. The people are blind to what is happening, insensitive to the leveling 
emptiness of their words. Those who are adept in the resuscitated language-
'spellbound,' 'demonic,' 'sorcerers'-are poised above 'an abyss' (the word used five 
times in two pages). The conscientious of the present generation, who live in 
knowledge of the sacred language, shudder when, in the banal exchanges of this new 
'thoughtless conversation', 'a word from the religious sphere terrifies us, just here 
where it was intended to comfort' (Scholem cited in Derrida, 2002, pp. 226-227). 
Children exposed to this newly secularized language will grow up ignorant of the 
sacred language that lies beneath it. They will be tranquilized by this new 
'expressionless linguistic world', where language's originary force is stemmed. 
But what exactly is the abyss? Let us allow that this is, first, the archetypal image 
of danger and judgment, but associated with this there is also, second, a 
bottomlessness or absence of foundations, as well as, third, the darkness of the 
unknown. Crucial to the sense of this is an understanding of language that is at odds 
with prevailing theorizations, and it is here that the slurs against this new 'Esperanto' 
take a deeper turn. For, as Scholem insists, 'Language is Name [Sprache ist Namen]. 
In the names the power of language is enclosed; in them its abyss is sealed'. The 
present generation lives progressively in denial of this, but ultimately the force of the 
sacred will not be withheld, for the names have their own life without which 'our 
children ... would be hopelessly abandoned to the void' (p. 227). 
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BETWEEN TWO PLACES 
My discussion is based on Jacques Derrida's thought-provoking commentary on the 
letter in his enigmatically-titled essay 'The Eyes of Language', to which the text of 
the letter is attached as an appendix (Derrida, 2002). Derrida's reading generalizes 
implications of the letter, in ways that extend beyond this historical moment to 
questions of language and tradition, and of relations between generations. He is 
concerned less with any special status of Hebrew than with the relations between the 
sacred and the profane within language more generally. Let us attend first, then, to his 
evocation of anxieties about profanation that Scholem expresses: 
This linguistic evil does not let itself be localized or circumscribed. It does not 
only affect one means of communication precisely because it degrades into a 
means of communication a language originarily or essentially destined for 
something entirely distinct from information. One transforms a language and, first 
of all, names,. into an informative medium ... The evil stems from the fact that 
Zionists-those who believe themselves Zionists and who are, in fact, no more 
than holding this power, nothing other than falsifiers of Zionism-do not 
understand the essence of language. They treat this abyssal mystery as a 
problem-worse, as a local, specific, circumscribed, techno linguistic or techno-
political problem. This is why they are asleep and why one day they will wake up 
on the verge, even in the midst, of the catastrophe, at the moment when the sacred 
language will return, as punishment and retumlghostliness (revenance) (Scholem 
cited in Derrida, 2002, pp. 194-195). 
The blindness to which those who use this degraded language succumb is not an 
incapacity of its sorcerers alone: 'The blind men that we are, almost all of us, live in 
this language, above an abyss' (p. 197). 
Derrida refers to the letter as a 'correspondence without correspondence' (p. 194), 
acknowledging the rift between Scholem and Rosenzweig: an experience of 
difference thus conditions not only the 'confession' but the reading itself. And this is 
multiplied later, as we shall see, in Derrida's difference from Scholem over the central 
problematic. 
Derrida characterizes Scholem's position as follows: 'As sacred, Hebrew was both 
a dead language-as a language one didn't or shouldn't speak in daily life-and a 
language more living than what is generally called a living language.' But in its 
revived form it has turned into a 'a non-language, the frozen grin of a semiotics or 
disincarnated fleshless [decharnee] and formally universal exchange value, an 
instrument in the commerce of signs, without a proper place, without a proper name, a 
false return to life, a shoddy resurrection' (pp. 209-210). It is 'a language that one 
pretends to resuscitate by giving it this masked body, this gesticulation of an 
Esperantist masquerade, this puppet of a technological and cadaveric instrumentality' 
(p. 210). Thus, the people who speak it are doubly responsible: first, because they are, 
as one always is, dominated by language-yet do not acknowledge, perhaps are 
incapable of acknowledging, that this is so; and second, because they are not aware of 
their responsibility towards the legacy of language and have not asked questions about 
it. But, Scholem warns, this false cadaver will animate itself, unleashing itself on the 
demonic sorcerers, who are themselves spellbound. To say this is already to do two 
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things. First, it is to take language as speech, and as speech in the name of someone 
who is not a subject but a creator and origin-for Scholem, in the name of God. 
Second, it is to take language as basically non-conceptual (at least to the extent that 
concepts are thought of in terms of a formalizable, instrumentalizable, technologized 
generality of meaning): it is indissociable from proper names. Hence, Scholem 
excludes any possibility of a contamination from the start. 
Derrida writes with wry understatement: 'This interpretation of language and of 
technology obviously should be, in my view, problematized-at least' (p. 211). To the 
extent that originary and technological language are dissociated, and that the outside 
to the origin is regarded as contaminating, this aligns with a certain, Christian 
interiorization of the spiritual, with speech the best articulation of interiority and 
writing a degenerate, material form. This is at once to evoke the ancient suspicion of 
writing5. and to identify writing as a technology, continuous with degeneration into 
mere communication, circulation, and exchange. This can be associated, Derrida 
suggests, with suspicions of semiotics harbored by Walter Benjamin, Scholem's 
friend, with its 'bourgeois', traditional oppositions of 'sensible/intelligible, 
form/meaning, content/form, signified/signifier, whether understood in their platonic 
tradition or in their modernization' (p. 223). Blindness to the sacred language sustains 
these oppositions, upon which not just semiotics but philosophy itself, in some of its 
familiar aspects, has been based. This is blindness to the fact that language is not just 
a grammar or a system of communication and reference but, beyond these, a naming. 
Names are not substantives, cashable in sets of predicates, and hence not, contrary to 
Frege, Russell, and Mill before them, 'disguised, definite descriptions'; they are not to 
be accounted for in Carnap's 'anti-metaphysical' logical empiricism; and they are not 
fundamentally signifiers correlating with signifieds: they are a calling, a summons, an 
invocation. This is seen most clearly in proper names. And it is telling that the proper 
name is untranslatable: Michel is not Michael, London not Londra. 
In this naming, there is-and let this scandalous thought be acknowledged-a 
kind of haunting of our language. Haunting is surely evident in that the words we use, 
the very terms of our thought, are, as Derrida has extensively shown, available to us 
only from origins we cannot know, with connotations we cannot fully fathom; and in 
using them we become hostage to future interpretations, relocations, and re-
associations of our words that extend beyond our control. Words are not just tools, 
fully present to us for our use: they depend in their essence on this non-presence. 
Better put, the spectral aspect of our words-and hence of our thought and being-
defies any oppositional logic of presence and absence. Indeed, some sense of this is 
evident in Scholem's double reference to the ghostly (gespenstisch) character of the 
language, ultimately its haunting by the name of God. Secularizing the language, we 
are 'playing with the ghosts' (p. 214). 
But there is a paradox in the letter. On the one hand, it is impossible for the words 
of a sacred language to be emptied of their original meaning, with which they 
overflow, and hence secularization is impossible; in the end it is only a 'far;on de 
parler', a circulation of ready-made phrases. And yet, on the other hand, 
secularization does take place. Stephane Moses' commentary-which touches on our 
propensity to be scandalized by these thoughts-gives this a psychoanalytic reading, 
taking the 'impossibility' of secularization as representative of repression and return: 
the ghost is the revenant. This is to identify those who live within the terms of this 
secularization as suffering from a 'collective neurosis' (Moses cited in Derrida, 2002, 
p. 225). Scholem's confession at once laments what has happened and warns that a 
price will be paid. We stand above an abyss, and the abyss hides a volcano. Language, 
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full to bursting, is a volcano, and eventually it must erupt. The fire inside the volcano 
represents an original purity, authority of the name, source of justice; outside the 
volcano there is only technological contamination, the instrumental circulation of 
signs. Secularized language, with its planning, systematization, and codification in 
rules, offers us mastery and an ordering of the world, but we must attend to what 
defies this. 
It is, however, here most clearly that Derrida's thought moves away from Scholem 
to enable us to see how the gap between the sacred and the non-sacred can produce 
'an experience of the edge, the edge of the abyss, between two places' (p. 217) that is 
precisely the space of responsibility and judgment. 
Earlier in the text Derrida has raised the question-from a position, he claims, of 
'incompetence' --of how the words Verweltlichung (laicization, secularization) or, in 
its Latinate version, Siikularisierung, could themselves be translated into the sacred 
Hebrew, and hence how the opposition upon which Scholem's account depends could 
be realized in its terms. (A certain linguistic distaste is reflected in the scare-quotes 
Scholem gives to Siikularisierung. He is already, it would seem, struggling with the 
word Verweltlichung because of its associations with the haskalah, the Jewish 
Enlightenment of the 18th and 19th centuries with its controversial universalist 
orientation.6) This opens to a broader point, as Derrida shows: what, if there is one, is 
the 'Jewish equivalent for the spirituaVworldly, sacred/secular opposition, etc.?' Can 
one have the thoughts that Scholem expresses in the letter if one has only the original 
Hebrew? Can one have these thoughts, this experience of the abyss, without the 
movement between languages that translation affords? One need only gesture to the 
connections and disconnections between 'spirit', Geist, and esprit for the implications 
to multiply, in ways to which the troubled translation of revenance already testifies. 
Moreoever, Derrida's hopeful thought at the end is to wonder how far Moses' reading 
of this letter can open onto a new possibility of subjectivity, a new relation to the sign, 
characterized by an experience of paradox. Paradox arises from the combination of, 
first, the insight into language realized in Scholem's letter, modified by Derrida's 
reading as indicated above, and, second, Moses' thematization of the instrumen-
talization of language and his psychoanalytic identification of repression, themselves 
products of a certain modem rationalism, and hence outside the sacred language. 
Derrida ponders the thought that the force of such an experience of paradox might 
enable 'a deconstruction of the philosophical oppositions that govern a semiotism 
inherited from both Platonism and the Enlightenment' (pp. 224-225). 
Might not the deconstruction of this semiotism realize those values of the 
Enlightenment with which Putnam is concerned in ways that can meet the problems 
he raises? 
THE EXPERIENCE OF TRANSLATION 
My discussion has so far only touched on questions of translation.7 What can be said 
of the forms of experience that translation identifies or realizes in Derrida's text? In 
Scholem's letter this is apparent from the start: his question is about the fate of 
Hebrew when it undergoes a kind of translation-its deliberate revival and more or 
less artificial conversion to secular, vehicular use. What is at stake here is in a sense 
not 'his' language, for Scholem writes to Rosenzweig in the German they share. Yet 
in his almost visceral discomfort, he resorts to scare-quotes and French: what is to be 
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said exceeds the language in which he finds himself. A foreign expression in a text 
can create particular problems for the translator as the sense of the outside that is 
thereby achieved cannot simply be replicated, particularly where the foreign 
expression is in the translator's target language. Added to these problems is the fact 
that the first publication of Derrida's text is not in French but in English, in Gil 
Anidjar's translation. Hence the published essay as a whole is interrupted both by 
Derrida's inserted comments into quotations from Scholem and Moses, and Anidjar's 
editorial additions of the original German or French expressions that were used. The 
function of these additions is typically to reveal a gap between the sense of the 
original term and the one the translator has chosen, perhaps faute de mieux, and this is 
a gap that typically cannot be closed. This occasions for the reader an experience of 
the abyss that lies beneath our habitual use of language, an experience that makes all 
the more vivid the way that the name arises, less as pure reference and partly as 
invocation. 
Translation fore grounded in this way exposes something of the space of 
responsibility and judgment, while ideological position-taking is commonly shored up 
by monolingualisms of various kinds. Can English as a world language make the 
world monolingual? It is with some thoughts about its potential to realize one culture, 
one education, that I shall conclude. 
MONOLINGUALISM AND THE MEASURE OF EDUCATION 
This paper began with the broad and chilling sweep' of Putnam's question about the 
Enlightenment and the Holocaust, raising the philosophical stakes of pragmatism and 
relativism; and it narrowed and accentuated the attention on language through 
scrutiny of Scholem's letter, heavy with expectations of Israel. I realize the risk of 
bathos as I now move from the weight of such matters to the stuff of ordinary, fairly 
privileged lives. But in a sense this is a risk I have wanted to court. For while it would 
be callous to make connections too easily here, if we take the converse view, that it is 
wrong to make them at all, we compound our bourgeois, voyeuristic detachment in 
our own forms of blindness to the abyss: we immunize ourselves from the 
responsibility to language that translation so powerfully demonstrates. So let me 
narrow the focus and blatantly domesticate it, and this in two ways. 
If one imagines, first, philosophy of education meetings around the world, at 
which thoughts such as Putnam's might be entertained-say, (i) in the joint meeting 
of the Korean and Japanese Societies, (ii) the Philosophy Network of the European 
Educational Research Association, and (iii) the annual gathering of PES-it is a 
striking fact that in each case English is the lingua franca. Of course, this seems clear 
evidence once again of the growing hegemony of English in the world, but the 
situation is more complex than this. There are good reasons for the use of English in 
these contexts, and the reasons are not uniform. In the first case English is adopted as 
a convenience by people who come from countries where their own language is 
mostly unchallenged. The second case is somewhat different because of the inclusion 
of quite large numbers of native speakers of English alongside a majority who speak 
English as a foreign language, most of whom come from countries where their own 
language is dominant. In the third, the dominant home language is spoken, and those 
American and Canadian participants whose first language is not English will most 
likely have grown up in circumstances where their own language is subordinate. As is 
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so· often the case in matters of translation, there are gains and losses, and to see this 
we need to revert; however jarring this may seem, to the terms of the above 
discussion. The obvious problems of colonization must be considered alongside the 
threat of vehicularization. If the experience of difference is of value in the realization 
of the abyssal nature of language, it may be that those who find themselves speaking 
languages other than their own are in some ways in a heightened position: they are 
caused to think between languages. But where the outcome is a compromise over 
meaning, a good-enough-to-get-you-there vehicularization, the abyssal nature of 
language and the enigma of naming are progressively obscured. If the world language 
is not in fact English but English-as-a-second-language, a crucial question needs to be 
asked: is such a language destined to be vehicular, or does its coming to common use 
occasion the experience of translation that is advocated here? 
The problems under discussion extend far beyond academic conferences, and 
beyond matters so specifically linguistic. Thus, if one turns, second, to practices of 
education, the focus can be widened somewhat, still demonstrating how troubling 
questions of meaning reverberate through ordinary lives, in schools and universities. 
Pretensions of one language, one culture, are realized in education in such 
developments as international league-tables (PISA), standardized measures of 
performance (Bologna), and international research quality indicators (bibliometrics). 
What increasingly needs to be asked is how far such measures have turned into a 
cadaveric instrumentality, with shoddy resurrections of value and spellbound 
standards: the much-vaunted 'objectivity' of exhaustive specifications of criteria 
covers over the space of responsibility, blocks the practice· of judgment, on which 
culture and education ultimately depend. The double genitive in 'the measure of 
education' invites the thought that there is a need to look less at how we measure 
education and more at how our education is a measure of ourselves. Can education, in 
its cultural, linguistic variety give us the measure of things-of our societies, of what 
we can become? Abyssal thought such as this articulates an appropriate correlate in 
education of the idea that secularization is impossible. If the originary force of 
language that must run through education is stemmed, is this not enough to make the 
angels weep? 
NOTES 
This is given an extended meaning by Steiner to include not only the 'execution' of six million 
Jewish women, men, and children, but the killing of seventy million people, by war, genocide, and 
so on, in the thirty-seven years beginning in 1914. Putnam chooses to write' "execution" to bring 
out the horrible "legality" of the proceeding, as contrasted with a mere "slaughter" , (Putnam, 
1994, p. 182). 
2 Putnam says he is referring to a lecture given by Steiner a few years before at the Van Leer 
Foundation. 
3 Putnam refers in particular to B. Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. 
4 These lines are taken from W. James, 'What Makes a Life Significant?' in Talks to Teachers. 
5 The Phaedrus is the locus classicus for this suspicion. 
6 I am grateful to Monika Kaminska for drawing my attention to this. 
7 There has been a resurgence of interest in translation recently in philosophy of education (see 
Bergdahl, 2009; Saito, 2009; Ruitenberg, 2009; Harris, 2009). 
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